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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent. : Case No. 20030189 CA 
vs. : 
JAMES L. ROBISON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 
78-2a-3(2) (f) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the entry of Appellant's plea of guilty come as a result of the Court's full 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
2. Did the Appellant understand the nature and elements of the offense? 
3. Did the Appellant understand that his guilty plea was an admission of the 
elements of the offense? 
4. Was there a clear factual basis for the charge to which the guilty plea was 
entered? 
5. What was the plea agreement? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7 (Due Process of Law) 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11. Pleas 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The action in this case was initiated by an Information filed in Juab County, Utah 
on the 24th day of October, 2001 wherein the Appellant was charged with criminal 
offenses of: Count I, Issuing a Bad Check; Count II, Issuing a Bad Check; Count III, 
Equity Skimming of a Vehicle (R.l). Count III, was dismissed at preliminary hearing, 
then amended to a charge of Theft by Deception (R. 110). 
The Appellant eventually entered a plea of guilty to Count I, Issuing a Bad Check. 
However, within the time allowed, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and raising 
issues of the Trial Court's compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This motion was denied, and Appellant filed his appeal of that ruling. 
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STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of Utah entered on March 4, 2003 denying 
Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1, 2001, Appellant, a licensed vehicle dealer, acquired from Painter 
Motor Company of Nephi, Utah, by oral agreement to purchase, a 2002 GMC K 2500 
truck. On or about September 17, 2001, Appellant delivered his check to Painter Motor 
Company in the sum of $40,812.00. This check and a subsequent check were dishonored 
by the drawer banks. Between September 1 and September 17, Appellant had sold the 
truck to a good faith purchaser, who paid in full for the truck. The payment funds were 
never used to cover the checks, nor was any part delivered to Painter Motor. Criminal 
proceedings were then initiated against Appellant. 
The Appellant secured the services of Gary Weight as defense counsel and 
initiated a defense of the case, including preliminary hearing, motions to suppress, and 
requests for jury trial. During the course of these proceedings, discussions were had 
regarding a resolution of the matter by a plea agreement. Nothing firm was 
accomplished on the plea agreement and the matter was scheduled for trial. (R. 194) 
After the case was scheduled for trial, Gary Weight, as legal counsel, filed a 
request for continuance of trial. (R. 198) That request was denied and he then moved to 
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be relieved as legal counsel for the Defendant. (R. 217) 
As these matters were progressing, the discussion regarding the plea bargain was 
intensified. Finally some tentative agreements on plea bargaining were reached and the 
Defendant/Appellant appeared before the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr., District Judge, 
on the 16th day of October, 2002 for the purpose of entry of plea. 
The Defendant/Appellant had discussed the proposed plea agreement at length 
with his legal counsel and a Statement of Defendant in Support of No Contest Plea and 
Certificate of Counsel was prepared and reviewed prior to the court appearance. (R. 247) 
This Statement contemplated that the Defendant/Appellant would enter a plea of 'no 
contest' to the second degree felony of Issuing a Bad Check. 
As the parties appeared before Judge Eyre for the entry of the plea, controversy 
arose over the exact terms of the plea agreement; with the County Attorney indicating 
that he was not willing to accept a plea of "no contest'. This discussion took place in 
open court and is contained within the transcript of the plea hearing. (R. 398) A reading 
of the entire transcript is required for a full understanding of the facts. 
The Defendant entered a plea of 'guilty' to the charge of a second-degree felony 
of Issuing a Bad Check. The discussion included questions to the Defendant by Judge 
Eyre regarding his acknowledgment of the elements of the offense. 
When these questions were presented to the Defendant and he was asked if he 
acknowledged committing the elements set forth, he indicated "No." Further discussion 
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was had, but that issue was never really resolved and the Defendant never did admit to 
committing the elements of the offense. However, the Judge accepted his 'guilty' plea 
and the matter was scheduled for sentencing. The Defendant was sentenced. 
Defendant/Appellant, on his own, filed a motion to withdraw his plea of 'guilty'. 
(R. 252) The motion set forth the terms for the withdrawal of the guilty plea as then 
considered by the Defendant/Appellant, who was acting as his own counsel. This 
pleading discloses his confusion at the plea transaction and his continual denial of the 
elements of the offense to which the plea was tendered. 
The Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was denied. 
However, the Court did note the confusion and questions concerning certain issues 
occurring during the plea hearing. (R. 280) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Consideration of such a motion is a privilege and is within the sound discretion of 
the court and thus the standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Mora, 472 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 4. (Utah Ap. 2003) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's guilty plea was entered under confusing, contentious circumstances, 
using a written plea statement modified in open court, then containing contradictory 
elements and the Appellant clearly denied the proposed offense elements. Thus the plea 
was not voluntarily and knowingly tendered. 
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ARGUMENT 
The Trial court filed to comply with the provision of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, in the following respects: 
A. Was there a clear statement as to the elements of the offense to which the plea 
would be tendered? 
B. Did Appellant admit his commission of the elements of the offense? 
C. Was there a written plea agreement that was clear, consistent, and supportive 
of the plea entered and the Court's compliance with the requirements of Rule 11? 
This case involved the consideration of the facts evidenced by the State of the 
record, including the initial form of the Statement By Defendant in Support of No 
Contest Plea and Certificate of Counsel (R. 247) and the colloquy during the change of 
plea hearing occurring before Judge Eyre on the date that the plea was entered (R. 398) 
and the application of those facts to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
address the question of the Trial court's abuse of discretion in denying 
Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Acceptance of a plea of guilty generally requires that the court determine that the 
Defendant/Appellant accepts responsibility for the facts supporting the allegations of 
guilty, acknowledges his commission of the egregious acts, acknowledges that he 
understands his legal rights and that he is willing to waive those rights in favor of the 
entry of the plea of guilty and he is acting freely and voluntarily. The pertinent 
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provisions of Rule 11 are as follows: 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. 
The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty 
by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in 
the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant 
refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the 
court. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea under the court has 
found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all of those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient 
it if establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the 
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court 
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has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged 
the contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to 
any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
The application of Rule 11 in actual in-court settings has been reviewed by 
appellate courts in the State of Utah on prior occasions and the following cases seem 
pertinent to the instant appeal: State v. Martinez. 2001 Ut 12,26 P.3d 203; State v. 
Gibbons, 1987 Ut, 740 P.2d 1309; State vs. Maioir. 1991 Ut, 830 P.2d 216; and State v. 
Mora, 2003, Ut Ap. 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
The Defendant/Appellant represents to the Court that the important provisions of 
Rule 11 to be considered by this Court as those found in Sections: 
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense . . . and that the plea is an admission of all those elements. 
(e) (4) (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. 
(e) (6) if the tendered plea is a result of prior plea discussion . . . what 
agreement has been reached. 
As to these provisions, the Defendant/Appellant represents to the Court that, 
considering the slatus of the case, the fact that counsel for the Defendant/Appellant was 
attempting to withdraw from representing him (R. 217); that request to continue the trial 
date had been denied (R. 198); and further that the Defendant/Appellant understood that 
there were no funds available to him to secure witnesses in his own behalf left him in an 
extremely depressed, anxious, and unbalanced mental state with regard to fairly 
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accepting a plea statement. This state of mind should have been considered by the Trial 
Court as the plea proceedings were undertaken. 
The Defendant/Appellant enters into the plea process in that frame of mind. He is 
confronted by controversy erupting in open court as he is prepared to plead 'no contest'. 
Then and there, learning that such a plea was unacceptable and no break was taken to 
allow Defendant/ Appellant to talk to his counsel. The matter continued in open court 
before the Judge and essentially counsel for the parties and the Court then negotiated the 
plea to be tendered and accepted by the Court. However, from the statements made in 
that plea negotiation process, it is clear that there was no satisfactory compliance with 
Rule 11. In particular, the Defendant/Appellant never did acknowledge, and has never 
acknowledged, his guilt with regard to the commission of the acts which were the 
elements of the charge to which he entered the guilty plea. There was no clear factual 
basis for the plea and clearly there was no meeting of the minds of what plea agreement 
had been reached. A referral to the Entry of Plea Transcript (R. 398) reveals this 
important dialogue: 
Page 3, line 7 G. WEIGHT: I have prepared a statement of defendant 
in support of a no contest plea to issuing 
a bad check. 
Page 3, line 16 D. LEAVITT: We said that in exchange for the no 
contest it would be theft by deception. 
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Page 4, line 8 D. LEAVITT: Well, he can take his pick. He can have 
guilty to the bad check or no contest to a 
theft by deception. 
Page 4, line 14 G. WEIGHT: Well, I guess we don't have a deal, Your 
Honor. 
Page 5, line 1 J. ROBISON: Well, there was no intention to . . . no 
intention to a, steal this truck. 
Page 6, line 22 J. ROBISION: . check in existing on an existing debt 
and not of obtaining . . 
Page 7, line 15 G. WEIGHT: Well, I don't think we have a deal. 
Page 9, line 1 JUDGE EYRE: Do you have questions? 
Page 9, line 5 J. ROBISON: I do. 
Page 20, line 11 D. LEAVITT: Factual basis, this defendant... issued a 
check or draft a, in exchange for 
something of value at a time when the 
account upon which it was written was 
closed 
Page 20, line 16 J. ROBISON: That is not a correct statement, Your 
Honor. 
Quoting direct from Page 21, emphasis added: 
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JUDGE EYRE: Okay. You, you did issue a check which 







And a, upon notice of it not being 
honored did you, did you at any time 
make that check good? 
I attempted to5 Your Honor, and my 
bonding company also attempted to, but 
we were not able to completely do it. 
Okay. And, a, in exchange for that a car 
was delivered. Is that correct? A 
vehicle was -
J. ROBISON: No. The car was delivered several 
JUDGE EYRE: 
J. ROBISON: 
weeks prior to that. 
Well, I mean -
There was a vehicle in, a transaction did 
involve a vehicle. 
JUDGE EYRE: Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a 
value in excess of $5,000? 
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J. ROBISON: It did, Your Honor. 
JUDGE EYRE: The Court finds there's a factual basis 
accepts your guilty plea, finds it was 
voluntarily and knowingly given with a 
full understanding of your constitutional 
rights. 
Under the conditions pending, there was a requirement that the Court be much 
more cautious in accepting that plea than in usual cases because the Court was aware that 
the Defendant/Appellant understood that there were not funds available for him to have 
an adequate defense, that his legal counsel was in the imminent process of resigning. 
Under such circumstance, it was error on the Court's part to accept the plea when 
it was fully obvious that there was controversy between counsel which may have now 
been clearly understood by the Defendant/Appellant. A written plea statement was being 
used which was originally designed to present a 'no contest' plea. The statement was 
modified by crossing out 'no contest' and inserting 'guilty' nine (9) times, but continued 
with the words 'no contest' seventeen (17) times: 
'No contest' changed to 'guilty' 
2 times on first page (R. 247) 
2 times on second page (R. 246) 
1 time on third page (R. 245) 
4 times on fourth page (R. 244) 
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'No contest' unchanged 
1 time on first page (R. 247) 
5 times on second page (R. 246) 
6 times on third page (R. 245) 
1 time on fourth page (R. 244) 
4 times on fifth page (R. 243) 
Furthermore, the Defendant/Appellant was denying the essential elements of the crime to 
which the plea of'guilty' was being accepted. 
The appropriate action to have been taken was to have the matter recessed so that 
the Defendant/Appellant would have a full opportunity to talk with his counsel and that 
he and his counsel together could represent to the Court that they understood all of the 
requirements of entry of the guilty plea and that the Defendant/Appellant, with that 
understanding, could voluntarily enter the plea. 
The burden the State carries in such cases is to ensure that a Defendant knows of 
his rights and thereby understands the consequences of a decision to plead guilty. 
Clearly, the then-existing circumstances did not arise to this level. 
The plea should not have been accepted and the motion to allow the 
Defendant/Appellant to withdraw that plea should have been granted by the Court. The 
denial of such a motion is an abuse of the Trial court's discretion. 
There is no loss to the State or to society by withdrawal of the plea. All of the 
evidence necessary to support the initial charges is still available, has not diminished, and 
no parties are prejudiced if the Defendant/Appellant's motion is granted. The State then 
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has full opportunity to prosecute the Defendant/Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been 
granted considering the confusing proceedings in taking the plea. The trial court erred in 
denying the motion and the appellate court should now overturn the trial court's ruling 
and direct that the Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be granted 
and the case be reinstated as in its first and former state as it was prior to the entry of the 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 2003. 
MILTON T. HARMON 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7 (Due Process of Law) 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
Rule 11, Pleas (Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
III. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VEIL Judicial Department 
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
X. Education 
XI. v Local Governments 
XII. Corporations 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
XV. Militia 
XVI. Labor 
XVII. Water Rights 
XVIII. Forestry 
XDC. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
XXI. Salaries 
XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.! 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.! 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.! 
4.f [Religious liberty! 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.]. 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
LO. [Trial by jury.] 
LI. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
L2. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
L4. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
.5. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
.6. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
.7. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
8. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
9. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
!0. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
!1. [Slavery forbidden.] • 
12. [Private property for public use.] 
!3. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
4. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
5. [Rights retained by people.] 
6. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory] 
Section 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec, 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
AJ1 political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. * 1896 
Sec . 4. [Rel igious liberty.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed, The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. 1999 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec . 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. - 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec . 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is subs tant ia l evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by s ta tute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
78-2-7 JUDICIAL CODE 5461 
78-2-7, Repealed . 1986 
78-2-7*5, Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the,state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, include 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; ' 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 2001 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
78-2a-6. Appel late Mediation Office — Protected 
records and information — Governmental im-
munity. 
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pur-
suant to Subsection 63-2-20l(3)(b), information and records 
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the 
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate 
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack 
of participation in the settlement program shall be main-
tained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 63-2-
304(16), (17), (18), and (33). 
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case now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to 
the defendant; 
(c)(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration 
have engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the past 
five years; 
(c)(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys 
being considered; and 
(c)(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determi-
nation that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and 
effectively provide representation to the defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to 
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to 
represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding 
that counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be 
found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to 
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys 
must meet the following requirements: 
(d)(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in 
at least three felony appeals; and 
(d)(2) at least one attorney must have attended and com-
pleted within the past five years an approved continuing legal 
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the 
trial or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent 
an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to 
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-
conviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is 
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-
conviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experi-
ence of the appointed attorneys must meet the following 
requirements: 
(e)(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
served as counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction 
appeals; 
(e)(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at 
the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated 
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation; 
(e)(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
attended and completed or taught within the past five years 
an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in 
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty 
cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction 
proceedings in death penalty cases; 
(e)(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have 
tried to judgment or verdict three civil jury or felony cases 
within the past four years or ten cases total; and 
(e)(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attor-
neys must total not less than five years in the active practice 
of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow 
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be 
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively 
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be 
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel 
shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c). 
Rule 9. Repealed. 
Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in 
single court. 
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, cita-
tions, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may 
defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court tha t 
has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possi-
ble penalty of all the offenses charged. 
(1Kb) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or infor-
mation may not be separated except by order of the court and 
for good cause shown. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicat-
ing the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction 
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity 
shall prosecute the offenses. 
Rule 10. Arraignment. 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the 
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defen-
dant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Ar-
raignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist 
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or 
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him 
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or 
information before he is called upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional 
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time 
may be granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any 
proceeding provided for by s tatute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to 
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived. 
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own 
recognizance, prior to arraignment and ^thereafter fails to 
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a 
warrant of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited. 
Rule 11. Pleas . 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to 
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A 
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty 
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a 
plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent 
of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case 
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make 
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for 
a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or 
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, 
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the 
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prose-
cution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and ele-
ments of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis 
is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial 
risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of 
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense 
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discus-
sion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been 
reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of 
appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defen-
dant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting 
these factors after the court has established that the defen-
dant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of 
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the En-
glish language, it will be sufficient that the statement has 
been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral 
consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or 
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make 
a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any 
other party has agreed to request or recommend the accep-
tance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court. 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the 
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, 
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclo-
sure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel 
whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should 
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall 
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to with-
draw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court 
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if 
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or 
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. 
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is 
made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported 
by affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be 
raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(b)(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indict-
ment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdic-
tion in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall 
be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding; 
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence; 
(b)(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(b)(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(b)(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to 
trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be 
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including 
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the 
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or informa-
tion, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable 
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or 
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Rule 13. Pretrial conference. 
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial 
conference, with trial counsel present, to consider such mat-
ters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused 
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear. 
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall 
set out the matters ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be 
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall' 
be binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in 
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the 
court. 
Rule 14. Subpoena. 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or 
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connec-
tion with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be 
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, 
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon 
the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an 
information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court 
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the 
defendant, without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the 
